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“If things go wrong and we have large numbers of young men coming back home in body bags, people will want to
know who in Europe is responsible.” – Graham Watson MEP1
“If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.”
– James Madison2

Introduction
We live in an “age of accountability” (Fisher 2004: 1). Demands for public officials to
account for their decisions transcend levels of governance and are on the rise (Curtin 2005: 87).
Democratic principles affirm that people should have the ability to influence the decisions that
affect their lives (Kraft-Kasack 2008: 537; Stie 2010: 3; Peters et al. 2010: 4); however, because
people transfer their sovereignty to representatives, they manage government performance
through accountability mechanisms. These norms even extend to uses of power beyond the
nation-state (Fisher 2004: 1). For decades, Europeans held public officials indirectly accountable
for European Union foreign policy decisions through national elections; however, a meaningful
shift toward internal accountability occurred with the passage of the Lisbon Treaty (2009). As a
result, new systematic studies are necessary to investigate accountability in EU foreign policy.
The creation of the European External Action Service (2010) is momentous because it
confers upon a non-state entity a capacity formerly reserved only for states, namely the ability to
“enter into relations with other states.”3 Although this diplomatic service will represent nearly
half a billion people abroad,4 its accountability has not been a “much discussed theme” (Bátora
2010: 14). Instead, consecutive reforms “overlooked” accountability in external relations in order
to focus on “coherence, visibility, and continuity” (Barbé 2004: 49-50). Thus, the objective of
this thesis is to remedy the shortcoming. Employing established theory, it compares the
European External Action Service with the European Defence Agency in order to investigate
how it is accountable.
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The structure of the study is as follows. In the first section, it presents a critical evaluation
of the extant research on how Europeans hold the European External Action Service accountable.
In the second section, the paper advances an explanation for why the accountability present in
the European External Action Service exists. In the third section, it describes the methodological
procedures employed to assess the theory. In the fourth section, a comparison between the
accountability of the European External Action Service and the European Defence Agency
occurs. In the fifth section, a detailed description of the accountability of the European Food
Safety Authority occurs in order to present further confirmation of the hypothesis in another
policy environment. In the last section, concluding remarks summarize findings and propose
directions for further research.

The Literature
Several fields of research relate to an examination of how Europeans hold the European
External Action Service accountable. Since the executive and legislative branches exercised roles
in the creation process, the study must employ previous research on the effect of interinstitutional politics on the design of EU agencies. Next, in order to understand the strength of
the European Parliament under co-decision, an assessment of research on the topic will occur.
Additionally, the European Union has accountability deficits, and they are on the rise (Bovens
2007: 447). Moreover, in order to understand the current state of EU foreign policy, there will be
a review of its relationship to accountability thus far. Lastly, the paper will present reasons how
it can contribute to these fields of research through an investigation of accountability in the
European External Action Service.
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Inter-institutional politics plays a “decisive role” in the design of EU agencies (Kelemen
2002: 94). As the executive and legislative branches interact, they negotiate over the structures
new bureaucratic institutions receive (Kelemen 2002: abstract). Threatened, incumbent
bureaucracies will seek to protect their “territory” (Dijkstra 2008: 3). Apprehensive, Member
State governments, for instance, attempt to shield their national administrations from such
potential threats (Kelemen 2002: 103, 110). From their perspective, European agencies should
depend on – not rival – national administrations. As a result, the Council prefers to fill agencies
with their appointees and to limit their power to information gathering (Tarrant and Kelemen
2007: 30; Schout and Pereyra 2010: 1). Similarly, the European Parliament seeks to protect its
institutional self-interest (Tarrant and Kelemen 2007: 5). Council controlled agencies, it thought,
would weaken its influence at the implementation stage; therefore, in order to maintain relative
power, the European Parliament would need to extend its influence over the executive (Kelemen
2002: 104). Lastly, the European Commission resists attempts to reduce or remove its
“established powers”; therefore, it prefers that new agencies exist within its hierarchy (Kelemen
2002: 98, 101). According to Schout and Pereyra (2010), on the other hand, the European
Commission does not want people to feel that EU bureaucracy is “continually growing” (6). As a
result, the European Commission will accept losses in “bureaucratic turf” in order to improve its
focus on its “core competences: policy planning and policy enforcement” (Kelemen 2002: 98;
112). Therefore, agency design outcomes reflect a combination of institutional preferences.
The European Parliament receives influence from its co-equal legislative authority with
the Council. In principle, neither institution may adopt legislation without the other‟s consent.5
Originally, the European Commission and the Council could negotiate legislation between
themselves with “little reference” to the European Parliament (Burns 2004: 3). Known as the
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consultation procedure, it “effectively limited” the European Parliament to offering amendments
that could be ignored (Burns 2004: 3). Today, however, the co-decision procedure is the norm.6
Since Maastricht, each additional treaty has extended the practice to include new policy areas.
Since Amsterdam, public health and consumer protection fall under co-decision, and since
Lisbon, co-decision includes budgetary and staff regulations. Curtin (2005) suggests that the
increase in legislative power has produced a “more powerful role” (99) for the European
Parliament in the design of new agencies, and that the “intensity of its role” (102) in the design
process “directly relate[s]” (102) to its influence in the “selection and screening” (102) of
candidates for management boards. In addition, Kelemen (2002) suggests that the increase in
legislative powers will cause the European Parliament to oppose designs with administrative
autonomy (110). Therefore, the co-decision procedure provides the European Parliament a
capacity to extend its influence into the design of the European External Action Service.
According to Follesdal and Hix (2006), the “standard version” of the “democratic deficit”
involves five “main claims” (534). Firstly, as European integration increases executive power,
the ability of national parliaments to hold them to account decreases (Follesdal and Hix 2006:
534). Secondly, since the European Parliament is the only directly elected EU institution, a
suggested solution to add accountability is to increase the powers of the European Parliament
with regard to the Council and the European Commission (Follesdal and Hix 2006: 534).
Thirdly, although citizens elect their governments, national elections encompass domestic rather
than European issues (Follesdal and Hix 2006: 536). Fourthly, citizens see the European Union
as “remote and opaque” (Riekmann 2007: 122). Since it is exceedingly dissimilar from
accustomed domestic institutions, people struggle to understand it (Follesdal and Hix 2006: 536).
As Follesdal and Hix (2006) illustrate, appointments to the European Commission follow an
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“obscure procedure” that elects individuals neither directly nor indirectly by a single electorate
(536). Fifthly, the European Union adopts policies that do not have the support of a majority of
citizens in many or even most Member States (Follesdal and Hix 2006: 537). This “policy drift”
occurs because Member States are able to undertake policies at the European level that they
cannot pursue domestically; thus, policy outcomes are regularly to the right of domestic status
quos (Follesdal and Hix 2006: 537). Although scholars debate the validity of these claims
(Moravcsik 2008), this paper asserts the deficit is real and that it provided the environment for
the construction of the aforementioned EU agencies.
The Twenty-First Century presents European nation-states with the possibility of future
irrelevance in global affairs. Both Franco Frattini7 and David Miliband,8 foreign ministers of
Italy and the United Kingdom, respectively, have cautioned that without a common foreign
policy, European nation-states will become “spectators in a G2 world shaped by the US and
China.” Thus, sequential reforms have sought to develop a “single voice” (Meunier 2005: 2) that
would permit Europe the ability to “defend its values and promote its interests in the world”
(Irondelle 2008: 155). Originally, foreign policy cooperation encompassed informal consultation
among Member States. Confidential and strictly intergovernmental, European Political
Cooperation received the condemnation of the European Parliament as a “situation intolérable
qui constitue un désaveu de la démocratie parlementaire” (Barbé 2004: 52). Incrementally, a
“coordination reflex” (Nuttall 1992) began to develop wherein states “automatically [consulted]
their partners before defining their national positions” (Sjursen 2003: 5). As a result, the
Maastricht (1993) and Amsterdam treaties (1997) gradually added to the number of foreign
policy functions performed by European Union institutions (Barbé 2004: 52). Based in Brussels,
the Political and Security Committee, for instance, consists of Member State ambassadors who
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assist in the formation and implementation of common foreign policy initiatives. Actions by
these executive agents, however, are more difficult for national parliaments to control than
actions by cabinet ministers or domestic bureaucrats (Follesdal and Hix 2006: 535). As national
parliamentary control diminished, however, at the European level, no “substantial additional
democratic controls” emerged (Barbé 2004: 52). As a result, it became more difficult for
Europeans to hold officials responsible for their decisions. Therefore, EU foreign policy studies
suggest “Brusselization” (Barbé 2004: 48) impairs accountability.
Although these fields of study complement research into how Europeans hold the
European External Action Service responsible for its decisions, a shortfall exists that this
research paper addresses. Agency design studies explain that design outcomes are the product of
inter-institutional politics. Co-decision studies describe the method the European Parliament
employs to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the European Commission and the Council.
Additionally, European Union studies express the presence of an accountability deficit. Lastly,
EU foreign policy studies detail the history of cooperation and its accountability. Collectively,
these studies depict a European Parliament with the motivation and means to make the European
External Action Service responsible to it; however, scholars have scarcely assessed the outcome
that resulted. Bátora (2010) and Raube (2009), for instance, wrote before the finalization of
arrangements, and although Missiroli (2010) describes them, he examines them through the lens
of their contribution to the EU as an international actor. Similarly, Comelli (2010) considered an
analysis of the concession that the European Parliament obtained to be “beyond the scope of
[her] paper” (90). As a result, scholarly research will benefit from the examination that this paper
undertakes.

7

Theory
Institutional designs are more than considerations of efficiency; they are most often also
overtly political products (Moe 1995: 127). They reflect interactions between the actors needed
to ratify them (Wood and Bohte 2004: 176) and considerations of an uncertain future. Since
structural choices influence the content and direction of policy (Moe 1995: 127), actors desire to
construct institutions amenable to present and future interests. One inclination directs them to
design structures that connect them to the agency (Moe 1995: 122); on the other hand, another
inclination directs them to design “insulated” structures (Moe 1995: 124; Kelemen 2002: 96).
Therefore, the organization of public bureaucracy is “inextricably bound up with politics” (Moe
1995: 149).
Economic organizations are a type of governance structure wherein voluntary actors have
an incentive to pursue seemingly optimal arrangements (Moe 1995: 125). Public bureaucracies,
on the other hand, are “structures of coercion” that exist in order to impose costs on losers (Moe
1995: 126). As a result, losers have an incentive to want public bureaucracies to fail (Moe 1995:
127). Thus, they pressure the dominant actor for a design that “fragment[s] authority, [has]
labyrinthine procedures, and [has] mechanisms of political intervention” (Moe 1995: 138;
Kelemen 2002: 96). Constraints on enactment of the design affect the amount the dominant actor
accommodates these demands in order for it to prevail (Moe 1995: 127). Therefore, a different
definition exists between economic and political organizational arrangements: one seeks
efficiency; the other merely seeks ratification by a sufficient coalition.
Once established, a new institution becomes an actor in the realm of politics (Moe 1995:
182); therefore, its enacting coalition, those individuals who ratified the design, must consider
“bureaucratic drift” (Kelemen 2002: 96; Wood and Bohte 2004: 182). The enacting coalition
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desires to design structures that achieve its mandated functions; however, there are no assurances
that the agency will maintain the policy domain its enacting coalition envisioned over desires to
“strike out on its own” (Moe 1995: 121). Thus, the enacting coalition recognizes that it needs to
design a structure that “links” it to the agency (Moe 1995: 122). Common political control
methods include budgetary oversight and jurisdiction over appointments (Kelemen 2002: 96;
Moe 1995: 122). Thus, Wood and Bohte (2004) argue, “When the enacting coalition perceives
that the probability of bureaucratic drift is high, then they should prefer administrative designs
that… reduce transaction costs for monitoring the bureaucracy” (182).
The enacting coalition recognizes that elections impede it from continuous control of the
agency (Moe 1995: 124; Pierson 2000: 491). A new dominant coalition could emerge that seeks
to emasculate the achievements of the enacting coalition (Kelemen 2002: 96; Moe 1995: 124;
Wood and Bohte 2004: 180). “Coalitional drift” (Wood and Bohte 2004: 180), therefore, causes
designers to want to “shield” the bureaucracy from its opponents (Moe 1995: 124). For instance,
the enacting coalition may grant the agency formal autonomy or “minimize the power and
number of political appointees” (Moe 1995: 136-7). A “greater emphasis” on a career civil
service, Moe (1995) contends, lessens coalitional drift since “professionals generally act to
protect their own autonomy and resist political interference” (136). Although these impediments
safeguard “their” agency from coalitional drift, it simultaneously “shuts out” the enacting
coalition (Moe 1995: 125). Therefore, Wood and Bohte (2004) contend, “As the probability of
adverse coalitional drift increases, the expected beneﬁt from adaptive and responsive designs
decreases, because the probability of obtaining the potential beneﬁts declines” (181).
Although Shepsle (1992) argues that a solution to either drift “exacerbates” (115) the
other, Macey (1992) suggests his assertion “seems overstated” (109). An enacting coalition can
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reduce bureaucratic and coalitional drift simultaneously (Macey 1992: 94). The “most powerful
device” available to the enacting coalition is to “customize” designs that perpetually “generate
results that coincide” with its preferences (Macey 1992: 100). Since the enacting coalition may
“hardwire” (Macey 1992: 100) the agency to favor certain groups over others, “power and
legitimacy” (Macey 1992: 99) results from the design. “Undermined,” members of the
“destroyed group” are thus “unlikely” to influence the preferences of future coalitions (Macey
1992: 98-9). Therefore, an incentive exists for enacting coalitions to design agencies that clearly
identify “empower[ed]” groups over “disempower[ed]” ones in order to “minimize the chances
that politicians‟ preferences…will change over time (Macey 1992: 98-9). Although the enacting
coalition may design agencies in a manner that restricts the preferences of future politicians, it
must also ensure that the preferences of future bureaucrats reflect the “political equilibrium” that
existed during ratification (Macey 1992: 99). Agency policies change as the preferences of its
constituencies change; however, as Macey (1992) suggests, it is “implausible” (96) that its
constituencies will “simply wither away” (96) and abandon “reap[ing]” (109) the advantages
offered by the agency. Therefore, since disappearance of its constituencies would lose the
agency‟s raison d’être, both bureaucrats and the enacting coalition have a “mutual interest” in its
“health” (Macey 1992: 96). Therefore, “controlling” the design of an agency is “probably…the
single most important mechanism” employed to reduce bureaucratic and coalitional drift (Macey
1992: 109).
As a result, structural design is an iterated political game (Moe 1995: 146). In the
“formative round” (Moe 1995: 146), constraints on ratification frequently require the inclusion
of individuals opposed to the success of the agency. They attempt to construct an inefficient
agency burdened with arduous conditions. Once approved, the agency is susceptible to both
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bureaucratic and coalitional drift. Bureaucrats may begin to “shirk” the responsibilities the
enacting coalition intended in order to promote their own autonomy (Moe 1995: 145). Therefore,
an incentive exists for the enacting coalition to make the agency accountable to it. On the other
hand, the enacting coalition concedes that elections hinder perpetual hegemony over the
institution (Pierson 2000: 491). As a result, an incentive exists for the enacting coalition to “bind
[its] successors” (Pierson 2000: 491). Since the “trade-off” between these two forms of drift
presents the enacting coalition with a “legislative possibility frontier” (Macey 1992: 98; Shepsle
1992: 115) over short-term and long-term interests, a theory about bureaucratic organization
“cannot help but be a thoroughly political theory” (Moe 1995: 148).
Insert Table 3.1

Hypothesis
Institutional design entails the building of an enacting coalition. For the European
External Action Service, the benchmark for ratification was strenuous. Before the Council could
decide on establishment, the High Representative needed to “consult”9 with the European
Parliament. Afterwards, the proposal needed to achieve the “consent”10 of the European
Commission. Due to their composition, these institutions represent different interests. Members
of the Council represent national governments; on the other hand, members of the European
Parliament represent European constituencies. Finally, although appointed by national
governments, members of the College of Commissioners represent the interest of their respective
portfolios. As a result, in order for the proposal to prevail, these interests would have to
compromise. Therefore, this thesis assumes the design of the European External Action Service
reflects inter-institutional negotiations.
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The enacting coalition desires to create a European External Action Service that
minimizes bureaucratic drift. An incentive exists for the European Commission and the Council
to maintain “existing policy-making and enforcement competences” (Kelemen 2002: 98);
however, each decided to terminate their respective foreign policy bodies in order to create an
institution outside of their hierarchies. On the other hand, an incentive exists for the European
Commission and European Parliament to exploit the demilitarization of foreign policy issues in
order to maximize their competencies beyond the first pillar (Dijkstra 2008: abstract); however,
the Council retains influence over military affairs. Therefore, although the European External
Action Service is outside of their hierarchies, each institution has an interest to ensure that it does
not deviate from its interests. As a result, this thesis assumes each institution will seek to
minimize bureaucratic drift by institutionalizing mechanisms that ensure that the European
External Action Service is accountable to it.
Simultaneously, the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council
have an incentive to establish barriers to coalitional drift. Again, subsequent coalitions might
negate actions undertaken by the enacting coalition. Due to separate national elections, the
composition of the Council is constantly susceptible to change. Although appointed, members of
the College of Commissioners serve terms equal to the duration of a European Parliament, i.e.,
five years. Therefore, since the enacting coalition cannot expect that its position of power will
remain, this thesis assumes it will endeavor to minimize coalitional drift by impeding its
successors from influencing the European External Action Service.
As a result, inter-institutional negotiations determine the drift equilibrium the enacting
coalition accepts in the design. If a member of the enacting coalition is relatively powerful, then
it may direct the equilibrium towards its drift preference. Therefore, although the European
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Parliament participates in the design negotiations, it would be ineffective without co-equal
legislative authority with the Council. Kelemen (2002) contends that the increase in legislative
powers changed the politics of “Eurocratic” structure because it permitted the European
Parliament the ability to assert a “more powerful role in the oversight of existing EU executive
bodies and in the design of new ones” (111). Motivated by the “threat” of Member State
appointees, the European Parliament seeks to seize the opportunity afforded by its “new political
stature” (Kelemen 2002: 104, 106). Because Council controlled management boards could
decide to reverse its decisions during implementation, the European Parliament advocates
structures it can supervise (Kelemen 2002: 110). Therefore, since co-decision enables the
European Parliament to be a veto player, it may achieve its desire for oversight.
Hypothesis: Legislative co-decision in the design of an agency increases
institutionalization of accountability to the legislature.

Alternatively, even with the addition of co-decision, the legislature may fail to secure
accountability gains, or choose not to pursue them, or choose to distribute them to another
institution. Additionally, national governments, for instance, may decide only to cede limited
regulatory oversight powers to the European Parliament, ones without de facto capacity to hold a
new agency accountable. Likewise, since the agency design is an iterated political game, the
European Parliament, for instance, may choose not to press for stringent controls over an agency
because concessions in one round of inter-institutional negotiations could yield even greater
payoffs in future rounds. Finally, given the political costs that come with greater responsibility,
actors in the European Parliament might choose to avoid increased oversight over a potentially
contentious new agency. Europe may be in an “age of accountability,” but “euroskepticism”
exists as well; therefore, the European Parliament could conceivably prefer to share its role with
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the European Commission or the Council in order to reduce receiving public dissatisfaction in its
entirety. As a result, if the evidence does not support the presented hypothesis, then one of these
alternative logics may exist.

Methods
The European External Action Service and European Defence Agency were chosen as
comparable cases because they cover policy fields that are integral to the “number one goal” of
states, survival (Mearsheimer 2001: 57). If states are constantly “suspici[ous]” that war
approaches (Mearsheimer 2001: 32), then cooperation in diplomacy and defense capacity
signifies that Member States accept the risk that partners may “cheat” in order to attain a
“significant advantage” (Mearsheimer 2001: 52). Similarly, there is consistency in the leader of
these two European Union agencies – the High Representative. A “double-hatted” individual
implies that European officials consider a connection between these two fields that necessitates
union in a single person.
Since the European External Action Service and the European Defence Agency are
comparable cases, the study employs a Most Similar Systems Design in order to test the
presented hypothesis. Such methodology is advantageous because it “keep[s] constant as many
extraneous variables as possible” (Anckar 2008: 389) so as “to isolate the explanatory value of
the independent variable as much as possible” (Anckar 2008: 399) in order to “establish whether
or not there is a causal relation between one specific independent variable and the dependent
variable” (Anckar 2008: 392). As a result, in order to test the effect of “X” on “Y,” only the “key
independent variable is allowed to vary” (Anckar 2008: 393). Therefore, the European Defence
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Agency represents the exclusion case in the comparison. In other words, in this instance, the
European Parliament did not use co-decision powers (Curtin 2005: Table 5.1).
Furthermore, a detailed analysis of the European Food Safety Authority is necessary in
order to add further support to the hypothesis. Similarly created under co-decision, it exists in
order to “harmoni[ze] product regulations for the Single Market” (Krapohl 2004: 520). After
several food scandals of the 1990s, the European Food Safety Authority provided a means to
standardizes foodstuffs “from the farm to the fork”11 throughout the union. Therefore, since it
oversees “potentially high risk [products] for consumers” (Krapohl 2004: 519), it tests the
hypothesis in another policy environment, public health.
The hypothesis tests an independent and dependent variable. The design of the European
External Action Service signifies the proposals that the High Representative presented to the
European Commission, European Parliament, and the Council; on the other hand, interinstitutional negotiations refer to compromises between the institutions of the European Union in
order to form an enacting coalition. Additionally, designs formalize inter-institutional
accountability (the dependent variable) when the European Parliament possesses co-equal
legislative authority with the Council (the independent variable). A bureaucratic institution
accounts when “[a] relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an
obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass
judgment, and the actor may face consequences” (Bovens 2007: 450). As a result,
institutionalization of accountability to the enacting coalition transpires when budgetary
oversight and/or jurisdiction over appointments exists.
Because transcripts of inter-institutional negotiations do not exist, this study collects data
from several sources in order to relate these occasions. News reports are one essential resource.
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Articles from independent news sources – EurActiv and EUobserver – describe meetings among
members of the European Commission, European Parliament, and the Council without the
ideological spin of many European publications (for example, l’Humanité, Libération, or Le
Figaro) or public funding (for example, BBC or France24). In regards to the European External
Action Service, articles cover negotiations conducted after ratification of the Lisbon Treaty (1
December 2009) until 1 December 2010 when the agency began operations. For the European
Defence Agency, articles cover the 2003 European Council meeting in Thessaloniki until 1
January 2005 when the agency became active. Lastly, articles that relate to negotiations on the
European Food Safety Authority cover the 1996 “mad cow crisis” until its launch in January
2002. Information is relevant if it describes the purpose, creation, and design of these cases
during these periods. Official European Union documents such as treaties and Council Joint
Decisions provide another means of information. Specifically, they include the procedures for
the design process, the proposals, and the design outcomes. Additionally, it is necessary to
employ materials located on official EU websites that detail the structures and functions of these
three agencies. Moreover, the study requires the use of research journal articles in order to
describe the current state of analysis on these three agencies‟ structures.

Analysis
European External Action Service
The road to the construction of the European External Action Service was lengthy.
Introduced in the Convention on the Future of Europe (2002-3), expressed in the Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe (2004), rejected twice by referendum (2005), resuscitated
by the German Presidency (2007), rejected by referendum again (2008), approved in treaty
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format (2009), the diplomatic service did not launch until 1 December 2010. Raube (2009)
emphasizes the influence of the first several of these events on the construction of the service;
however, the analysis that follows emphasizes post-treaty negotiations among EU institutions.
The intent is not to demean these previous negotiations; instead, the argument here is that the
Lisbon Treaty consigned substantial elements of the service‟s accountability until after the
treaty‟s ratification. Therefore, although the “broad traits” of the diplomatic service were agreed
to in the Convention on the Future of Europe, as Missiroli (2010) proposes, it is necessary to
examine the “concrete talks” of 2010 (433).
Once Member States ratified the Lisbon Treaty (2009), the search began for both a
President of the European Council and High Representative that could “stop traffic”12 in foreign
capitals. Out of the “chrysalis of a euro-compromise”13 emerged Herman Van Rompuy and
Catherine Ashton. Although Baroness Ashton had previously been EU Commissioner for Trade
and Leader of the House of Lords, she was relatively unknown; therefore, some argued that due
to Europe‟s selbstverzwergung,14 the European External Action Service would not receive the
publicity it deserved. Nevertheless, once the European Parliament confirmed her appointment as
a member of the College of Commissioners, she, together with a dedicated “High Level Group,”
set out to draft a proposal for the agency‟s design (Missiroli 2010: 435). Nevertheless,
apprehension over upcoming parliamentary elections in the United Kingdom compelled the
Council to set an April deadline (Missiroli 2010: 435). As draft documents circulated, however,
several events increased inter-institutional tensions: the Brok-Verhofstadt “non-paper,” the
appointment of João Vale de Almeida as the new Head of the EU Delegation to the United States
(Missiroli 2010: 436), and two decisions by the High Representative. Expressing the desires of
the European Parliament, the “non-paper” requested that the diplomatic service have closer
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association with the European Commission than the Council and that deputies to the High
Representative be “politically responsible.”15 On the other hand, Member States saw the
unilateral appointment of one of President Barroso‟s close aides as a “pre-emptive strike”
(Missiroli 2010: 436) by the European Commission to obtain a coveted ambassadorial position.
Simultaneously, High Representative Ashton received heavy criticism for her delayed visit to
earthquake-ravished Haiti as well as her decision to attend the Ukrainian presidential
inauguration of Viktor Yanukovych over a meeting of EU defense ministers in Mallorca.16 These
events characterize the environment that preceded High Representative Ashton‟s first proposal.
On 22 March 2010, High Representative Ashton presented a blueprint for the European
External Action Service to a joint General Affairs Council and Foreign Affairs Council.17
According to some, the document was intentionally “short and general”18 in order to avoid
controversy; nevertheless, disapprovingly, the European Parliament considered the document as
the “return of intergovernmentalism.”19 Thus, the European Parliament threatened that it would
stall the process through use of its authority under co-decision.20 On 26 April in Luxembourg,
High Representative Ashton presented a revised proposal to European foreign ministers who
reached “political agreement”21 on the document. As a result, formal consultations began with
the European Parliament in the context of a “quadrilogue”: Ashton‟s staff, the European
Commission, the EU Presidency (Spain), and a delegation of members from the European
Parliament (Missiroli 2010: 436).
The next stage of inter-institutional negotiations transpired throughout June and July
2010. On 21 June in Madrid, the four parties reached a “historic” (Missiroli 2010: 436)
compromise. Two weeks later, on 8 July, a plenary session of the European Parliament approved
the agreement with 549 votes in favor, 78 against, and 17 abstentions (Missiroli 2010: 436).
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Afterward, on 13 July, the Council requested that the European Commission give its consent; it
responded, a week later, unanimously in the affirmative (Missiroli 2010: 436). Subsequently, on
26 July, the General Affairs Council similarly approved the revised version. In October, the
European Parliament and the Council approved staff and financial regulations as well as
amendments to the 2010 budget. Finally, on 1 December 2010, the agency became operational.
According to the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament merely consulted the High
Representative on the construction of the European External Action Service.22 Establishment of
the diplomatic service, once consented to by the European Commission, however, was the
prerogative of the Council.23 On the other hand, because of “good strategic planning,”24 the
European Parliament was able to employ its co-decision powers in budget and staff regulations
to “create pressure”25 on the Council and European Commission in order to receive
concessions.26 As the leader of the Socialists & Democrats, Martin Schulz indicated, “If
[Parliament‟s] demands are not met, then “[Parliament] will not give the approval that is
needed.”27 As previously mentioned, in July 2010, the Council adopted a decision establishing
the new agency; however, the diplomatic service could not become operational until the
European Parliament approved staff and financial regulations. Therefore, these co-decision
powers effectively gave the European Parliament the “last word” over the European External
Action Service.28 As a result, it was necessary for the High Representative, the European
Commission, and the Council to appease the European Parliament on some of its demands in
order to create an enacting coalition.
Overall, negotiations over the European External Action Service were a “significant” 29
victory for the European Parliament. Although financial control of the service resides with the
European Commission,30 the European Commission routinely accounts for its budget to the
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European Parliament. In the past, a “gentlemen‟s agreement” limited parliamentary influence
because it did not specify expenditures;31 however, members of the European Parliament are now
able to hold officials accountable for every Union delegation and mission expense.32
Furthermore, the European Parliament was able to obtain a condition requiring at least sixty
percent of staff members to be EU fonctionnaires. The remainder are to be civil servants
temporarily seconded from Member States.33 Additionally, before taking up their posts, EU
Special Representatives and Heads of Delegation to countries and organizations that the
European Parliament considers “strategically important” will appear before the Foreign Affairs
Committee for an “exchange of views.”34 Since these occurrences are not US Senate-style
confirmation hearings, the European Parliament cannot veto their employment; however, these
and other regular briefings by top diplomats and staff will keep the European Parliament
informed on EU delegations and missions in order to make better decisions on the diplomatic
service‟s budget. Furthermore, the European Parliament succeeded to have only a “Member of
an EU Institution” substitute for the High Representative.35 Parliamentary rapporteurs were
adamant that when the High Representative is unable to attend a plenary session of the European
Parliament “unelected officials” – civil servants – should not substitute on her behalf (Missiroli
2010: 442). As a result, he or she is either a member of the College of Commissioners or the
foreign minister of a Member State; therefore, he or she is either directly accountable to the
European Parliament or indirectly accountable through a national government.
Lastly, it is important to note that the design of the European External Action Service
reflects inter-institutional negotiations. The European Commission received its request to
continue supervision of the European Union‟s development and neighborhood policies.36 The
original proposal, on the other hand, transferred these cooperation programs to the European
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External Action Service. Since the move would have “relegate[d] the Commission to … an
„internal market secretariat‟” (Bátora 2010: 5), the European Commission acted to maintain these
established functions within its hierarchy.
European Defence Agency
“Strategic culture(s) can change over time” (Gray 1999: 52). Traditionally, militaries
emphasized the protection of state territorial integrity (Barrinha 2008: 4; Bátora 2009: 1085);
however, increasingly, their focus is the multilateral projection of security abroad (Comelli 2010:
80). Bickerton (2010) proposes that European states, for example, underwent a shift from
egoistical “warfare” states to humanitarian “welfare” states (217). Indeed, the St. Malo
declaration (1998) affirmed that the European Union would strive to respond to international
crises with its own “credible military forces.”37 Although security and defense cooperation
would contribute to the overall European integration project as well as build the European Union
an international identity (Bickerton 2010: 222-3), autonomous action, however, requires a
“strong and efficient European armaments industry supported by public policy.”38 Therefore,
Member States, Bátora (2009) says, must take a “difficult leap of faith” and trust each other in
the “sensitive” area of “defense supplies and shared capabilities” (1092).
As Barrinha (2008) points out, the military sector is frequently associated with the ideas
of autarky and self-sufficiency (6). Arms imports expose one to supply cuts and, thus, make one
vulnerable (Barrinha 2008: 6). Independently, however, many European states cannot afford to
purchase or manufacture numerous weapons (Keohane 2004: 2). Moreover, efficiency suffers
due to “fragmentation [,] redundant spending… [and] wasteful duplication” (Bátora 2009: 1086).
Furthermore, separate defense industries expose Europe to a future as a “niche player” in the
global defense market (Barrinha 2008: 16-7). The situation is problematic because military
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equipment is “a form of power distribution in the international system” (Barrinha 2008: 6). A
state that controls military supplies is able to avoid market laws and to distribute them consistent
with its geostrategic interests (Barrinha 2008: 7). The United States, for example, is able to
“press” other countries to buy its military equipment because it possesses several large defense
corporations.39 As a result, there are several advantages for Europeans to pool military resources;
however, if they fail, then vulnerability lurks. The message is drastic but clear: “Europe must
unite for its own survival – this is no longer an option” (Barrinha 2008: 22).
The notion of a European agency over armaments dates back to a 1978 report by Egon
Klepsch to the European Parliament; however, more Atlanticist Member States, reluctant to
establish a European only organization, stopped its passage (Keohane 2004: 2).40 Although it
resurfaced as an attachment to the Maastricht Treaty, some Member States remained unwilling.
The United Kingdom, specifically, thought a European defense agency would erect a “Fortress
Europe” that would effectively obstruct them from contracts with non-European suppliers
(Keohane 2004: 2). Obligated, European defense ministries would “spend their money
unproductively on uncompetitive European monopolies” (Keohane 2004: 2). Then, in 2002, the
idea resurfaced during the Convention on the Future of Europe.41 Once the British government
had assurances that the Constitutional Treaty would exclude references to a defense agency, it
gave its support.42 With the exception of Denmark, the remainder joined during the 2003
European Council meeting in Thessaloniki.
Half a year later, a twelve-person group, the Agency Establishment Team, undertook the
role to create the defense capabilities agency that the Thessaloniki Presidency Conclusions
envisioned.43 Mandated by Council Decision 2003/834/EC, the team derived from the Council
Secretariat, the European Commission, and Member States.44 The Head of the Team, in
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particular, was a Member State candidate that received the consent of the Council and the
European Commission and the appointment of High Representative Solana.45 The European
Parliament participated neither in the appointment of team members nor in the formation of the
agency (Curtin 2005: Table 5.1). Therefore, it could not employ co-decision powers to
institutionalize mechanisms of accountability. Moreover, through the Head of the Team, Nick
Witney, regular reports went to an ad hoc group that reported to the Committee of Permanent
Representatives.46 Their deadline was the end of April 2004.47
In June 2004, the Council reached a consensus on the proposal to establish the European
Defence Agency. In comparison to earlier proposals, Council Joint Action 2004/551/CFSP
maintained the purpose and responsibilities of the agency; however, with regard to the
governance of the agency some modifications occurred.48 Members of the Council sought, for
instance, to make a “clearer distinction” between their responsibilities and those of the Steering
Board.49 A month later, High Representative Solana appointed Nick Witney, the former leader of
the Agency Establishment Team, to be the agency‟s first Chief Executive. Nevertheless,
although the Steering Board met for the first time on 17 September 2004, the European Defence
Agency was not operational until the mandate of the Agency Establishment Team ended on 31
December 2004.50
As previously mentioned, the European Defence Agency is “subject to the Council‟s
authority.”51 Member States exercise their control of the agency through their respective defense
ministers, who collectively compose the Steering Board. Additionally, two other officials sit on
the committee, a member of the European Commission and the High Representative of the
Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who acts as Head of the Agency. Since the agency
receives revenue exclusively from participating Member States, circumventing any role for the
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European Parliament, these twenty-eight officials exercise exclusive control of the agency‟s
budget and operations. Formerly, the European Commission thought its attendance to defense
meetings would “offend” Member States because it did not have “much to contribute in terms of
expertise” (Vanhoonacker et al. 2010: 10). At the time, its experience encompassed the
management of civilian crisis operations that derived from the CFSP budget (Vanhoonacker et
al. 2010: 11). Nevertheless, although the European Commission participates more in defense
decisions than in the past, the main “shareholders”52 of European Defence Agency vastly remain
the Member States. Below the Steering Board, a chief executive exists, appointed by the Steering
Board for a three-year term. Assisted by two deputies, he or she supervises the operation of five
directorates: capabilities, research and technology, armaments, industry and market, and
corporate services. Through the Steering Board, Member States determine who hold these
offices; therefore, officials account for their decisions to the people indirectly through their
national governments.

European Food Safety Authority
A “food scare” occurs when public anxiety over food safety incidents “spiral[s]” and
media attention “escalat[es]” (Knowles et al. 2007: 43). Since the mid-1980s, European countries
have experienced at least one or more significant scare (Knowles et al. 2007: 44). As a result,
today, food safety is an issue of “intense public concern” and, thus, a “highly political” one
(Knowles et al. 2004: 56). During food scares, shopping carts become “potent weapons”53 that
damage distributers and producers due to deteriorations in consumer confidence. In other words,
food scares may not be “serious in terms of life and death, even of the animal, but its practical
consequences on the livestock industry are devastating; if it is not eradicated, then, all intents
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and purposes, the effect is terminal” (Blair 2010: 309, emphasis added). Therefore, governments
react with new regulations and regulatory agencies (Knowles et al. 2007: 56).
On 20 March 1996, the UK Secretary of State for Health, Stephen Dorrell, announced a
possible connection between Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, a neurodegenerative disorder, and
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), a fatal neurological disorder that mainly affects adult
cattle.54 Immediately, domestic sales of beef products plummeted by 40%.55 A week later, the
European Commission shattered hopes of export sales with the imposition of a ban throughout
the union.56 Since the British government saw the ban as an attempt by other Member States to
devastate the British beef industry, it employed a “policy of non-cooperation” in all EU affairs
(Kelemen 2002: 106). As a result, at the Florence European Council (21-2 June 1996), Member
States decided to “gradual[ly] phase-out” the beef ban (Kelemen 2002: 106). Although while at
the summit, several heads of government sought to “ease” consumer confidence by “letting
themselves be seen whilst bravely eating beef,” beef consumption continued to drop
“dramatically,” corresponding to a “collapse” in the beef market (Vos 2000: 227). In the UK, the
price of cattle fell by over 25%.57 An industry estimated to be worth ₤3.2bn a year with 130,000
workers temporarily closed slaughterhouses or made workers part-time.58
“Seizing” the opportunity to apply new powers (Kelemen 2002: 106), the European
Parliament launched an investigation into the crisis on 18 July 1996. Months later, on 18
February 1997, the Inquiry Committee released its report, “clearly demonstrat[ing] [that] severe
shortcomings” in the management of the crisis were due to the European Commission (Vos
2000: 228). Although the European Commission responded instantly to the BSE crisis with the
ban, for several years, it had adhered to a policy of “disinformation” with the public and other
EU institutions on BSE (Vos 2000: 232). Therefore, the European Parliament gave the European
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Commission until October 1997 to reform or face censure (Kelemen 2002: 106). As a result, the
European Commission “moved towards an approach emphasizing food safety, linked to the
protection of consumers” (Vos 2000: 234).
The repercussions of the BSE crisis, the “trigger” for regulatory reform throughout
Europe (Knowles et al. 2007: 53), extended even to the Amsterdam Treaty (Vos 2000: 235).
Member States and EU institutions possessed a “strong desire” not to repeat the errors of the
BSE crisis; therefore, the Amsterdam Treaty overhauls Articles 95, 152, and 153 EC (Vos 2000:
235). Article 95 EC now obliges the European Commission to consider “any new development
based on scientific facts” as well as permits the Council the ability to introduce national
measures based on new scientific evidence when a problem is specific to that Member State (Vos
2000: 235). Similarly, Article 152 EC now permits the removal of veterinary and phytosanitary
measures from Article 37 EC when their direct objective is the protection of public health (Vos
2000: 236). Lastly, Article 153 EC now requires EU institutions to protect the health, safety, and
economic interests of consumers (Vos 2000: 236). Each one of these articles is subject to codecision (Article 251 EC).
Shortly after taking office, Romano Prodi, the President of the European Commission,
announced that food safety would be a “top priority.”59 Because the BSE crisis exposed the
“deficiencies” of the ad hoc approach (Vos 2000: 233), EU food safety policy needed to be
“proactive, not reactive.”60 Therefore, the European Commission promised to release a White
Paper on reforms within months with the intention of “establish[ing ] a coherent and up-to-date
body of food legislation by 2002.”61 Its findings emphasized that EU food policy “must be built
around high food safety standards, which serve to protect, and promote, the health of the
consumer.”62 Since the European Union would need to “cover the whole food chain and all food
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sectors” (Vos 2000: 245), the “most appropriate response”63 would be the establishment of “an
independent European Food Authority.”64 As a result, following the suggestions of the White
Paper, in November 2000, the European Commission proposed COM (2000) 71665 to the
European Parliament and the Council under co-decision. More than a year later, on 28 January
2002, both institutions approved Regulation No 178/2002,66 establishing the European Food
Safety Authority.
Since the Amsterdam Treaty extended co-decision to public health and consumer
protection, “strategic interaction” (Kelemen 2002: 109) among the European Commission, the
European Parliament, and the Council determined the design of the European Food Safety
Authority (Krapohl 2004: 529). During the negotiations over the design of the agency, the
European Parliament “insisted” that management structures and operating procedures provide it
with “opportunities for oversight and control” (Kelemen 2002: 109). In contrast to management
boards of agencies created under the consultation procedure, which Member State appointees
controlled, the European Parliament acquired the ability to consult the Council on its appointees
(Kelemen 2002: 108). Additionally, since there are only fifteen members on the management
board, not every Member State receives an appointee. One member must be a member of the
European Commission and four members must have their background in “organizations
representing consumers and other interests in the food chain.”67 Furthermore, before taking
office, the candidate selected by the management board to serve as Executive Director must
undergo a hearing before the European Parliament (Kelemen 2002: 108). Lastly, because the
agency receives its budget entirely from the EU budget, the European Parliament has jurisdiction
over its financing. Nevertheless, since the negotiations were inter-institutional, the European
Commission obtained status as the “formal agenda-setter within the decision-making process”
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(Krapohl 2004: 529). In other words, without its agreement, the agency cannot initiate policies
(Krapohl 2004: 529).
Insert Table 6.1

Conclusion
An analysis of how Europeans hold the European External Action Service responsible
was necessary because the diplomatic service will make decisions on their behalf. Moreover,
since the diplomatic service is new, there have been few studies done that focus on the interinstitutional negotiations that resulted after the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. Herein, the
research paper concentrated on the influence of the European Parliament to achieve its demands.
A comparison to the role of the European Parliament in the creation of the European External
Action Service with the European Defence Agency suggests that the European Parliament is able
to obtain concessions from other EU institutions when it possesses co-decision powers.
Similarly, since the European Parliament possessed co-decision powers in “the protection of
public health or the [sic] consumer protection” (Knowles et al. 2007: 57), it was able to make the
European Food Safety Authority accountable to it. On the other hand, during the construction of
the European Defence Agency, its range of co-decision powers did not apply; therefore, the
Council could circumvent it. During the construction of the European External Action Service,
however, co-decision powers acquired through the Lisbon Treaty, specifically staff and financial
regulations,68 permitted the European Parliament the ability to employ co-decision in order to
create formal accountability mechanisms. Therefore, as Kardasheva (2009) argues, co-decision
remains a “strong predictor” (19) of success for the European Parliament.
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How EU institutions implement accountability in the design of agencies has specific
implications for the academic debate on the European Union‟s “democratic deficit.”
Eurobarometer data suggests that a “large majority” of Europeans support “a European
government responsible to the European Parliament” (Lord and Beetham 2001: 446), that
Europeans trust the European Parliament (48%) more than either the European Commission
(44%) or the Council (40%),69 and that sixty-seven percent support making foreign policy
decisions within the European Union.70 Therefore, conceivably, Europeans would prefer that the
European Parliament oversee the European External Action Service. Furthermore, accountability
to the European Parliament helps resolve the “democratic deficit” because only the European
Parliament possesses the ability to hold policymakers responsible for common policies. Since
national parliaments are only able to evaluate the conduct of their governments, EU external
relations would require the approval of every national parliament in order to be legitimate (Bono
2006: 220); however, since national parliaments possess a diversity of “authority, ability, and
attitude” (Hänggi 2004: 12-5), only the European Parliament is able to provide uniformity in
accountability. As a result, external relations should become more legitimate.
Although legislatures are the “representative body of the polity” (Hänggi 2004: 7), critics
argue that legislatures “[interfere] in the conduct and implementation of [foreign] policy”
(Lalone 2005: 8). For them, secrecy, speed, and “flexibil[ity]” (Peters et al. 2010: 4) supersede
considerations of a “democratic deficit.” Traditionally, foreign policy received a higher level of
secrecy than other policies because states distrusted other states (Comelli 2010: 79; Peters et al.
2010: 3-4). Additionally, because unforeseen emergencies may occur, external policy decisions
may require haste; therefore, legislative involvement would only delay urgent decisions (Barbé
2004: 54; Comelli 2010: 79). Lastly, methods and goals for foreign policy must be “constant[ly]
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adapt[able]” (Thym 2006: 124). As a result, the normative implications of institutionalizing
accountability to the European Parliament are debatable.
Finally, enthusiasm to produce a “new paradigm” without rigorous hypotheses tests on a
theory impedes “cumulative improvements in knowledge” (Caporaso 1995: 459). Scholars, on
the other hand, should seek to discover falsifiable hypotheses by testing theories with a greater
amount and variety of data (King et al. 1994: 19). As a result, this study applied an established
theory of institutional design to the creation of the European External Action Service, the
European Defence Agency, and the European Food Safety Authority. Further research remains
necessary to test other applicable conditions for the theory. Considerations, for instance, may
lead scholars to search for cases that test an alternative hypothesis to the one presented here.
Although this paper contends otherwise, conceivably, the European Parliament could choose not
to obtain formal accountability from an agency through use of its co-decision power. Since
“emphasis on human rights and democracy promotion” is “central” to the “foreign policy
identity” of the European Parliament, the European Parliament may have sought to make the
European External Action Service accountable to it because it recognized that the “promotion of
[human rights and the rule of law] generally meets public opinion‟s concerns” (Bickerton 2010:
220-1). Similarly, the prominence of the BSE crisis may have made designing an agency
accountable to it desirous; on the other hand, non-salient issues could arise that are not
advantageous for the European Parliament to pursue. As a result, in these situations, since the
European Parliament trusts the European Commission to serve the “Community interest”
(Kelemen 2002: 97), the European Parliament would prefer the agency to account to the
European Commission rather than the Council.

30

Table 3.1

Bureaucratic drift

Coalitional Drift

Bureaucrats‟ preferences diverge from
enacting coalition.
Future coalition preferences diverge from
enacting coalition.
Both occur
Bureaucrats‟ preferences diverge from
enacting coalition.
Future coalition preferences DO NOT diverge
from enacting coalition.
Bureaucratic drift occurs, Coalitional drift
DOES NOT occur

Bureaucrats‟ preferences DO NOT diverge from
enacting coalition.
Future coalition preferences diverge from enacting
coalition.
Bureaucratic drift DOES NOT occur, Coalitional
drift occurs
Bureaucrats‟ preferences DO NOT diverge from
enacting coalition.
Future coalition preferences DO NOT diverge from
enacting coalition.
Neither occur
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Table 6.1

Codecision

EP budgetary
influence

EP appointee influence

HR/VP as a member of the College of
Commissioners
European External Action
Service

Yes

Yes

“Exchange of views” with Special Representatives
and Heads of Delegation
Deputies for the HR/VP are members of the College
of Commissioners

European Defence Agency

No

No. (Member
States in
proportion to
their GNI.)

HR/VP as a member of the College of
Commissioners

Consulted on Member State appointees
European Food Safety
Authority

Yes

Yes

Holds hearing on the Executive Director appointee
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